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Hidden Wealth and Incentives
Jin Yong Jung
This paper analyzes the characteristics of optimal menu of 
contracts in the case that agents’ wealth and actions are hidden 
from the principal. We first consider a benchmark case that the 
wealth levels of all agents are known to the principal, and we show 
that the power of incentives for agents with high wealth is greater 
than the one for agents with low wealth. The reason is that richer 
agents are less risk averse; providing high incentives for less risk-
averse agents is beneficial to the principal. However, in the case 
that the agents’ wealth is hidden, the principal will fail to achieve 
social efficiency because rich agents will act like poor agents. Thus, 
the principal must design another menu of contracts to prevent rich 
agents from mimicking poor agents. Ultimately, compared with the 
optimal menu of contracts derived when it was known, the power of 
incentives for rich agents is identical, but the power of incentives for 
poor agents declines.
Keywords:  Principal-agent model, Moral hazard, Adverse selection, 
Hidden wealth, Incentives.
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I. Introduction
Moral hazard problems can be mitigated by providing incentive wage 
contracts for agents. Therefore, when the principal faces the agents who 
are risk averse, but with heterogeneous risk preferences by different 
levels of wealth, the principal is willing to prepare a customized menu 
of contracts. However, if agents’ wealth is hidden from the principal, 
his/her plan will miscarry, because the rich (or poor) agent may act like 
a poor (or the rich) agent. Thus, the question about what is the optimal 
menu of contracts for them would be naturally raised. This is the main 
question of the paper. Thus, we study the principal–agent model with 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
 The existing literature about wealth effects under moral hazard 
problems has mainly conducted studies on the effects of agent’s 
wealth on the principal’s cost when his/her wealth is observable to 
the principal. Thiele and Wambach (1999) found that agent’s wealth 
positively affects the principal’s compensation cost under a reasonable 
condition on agent’s preferences, resulting in a negative effect on her 
profit. They actually showed that the principal prefers poor agents to 
rich ones. Later, more extended results are provided by Kadan and 
Swinkels (2013) and Chade and Serio (2014). Especially, Kadan and 
Swinkels (2013) not only showed that Thiele and Wambach’s results 
remain valid, but also provided some new results rather than them, 
assuming the principal–agent model in which the first-order approach 
is not adopted and the agent’s limited liability constraint is also 
considered.
Contrastingly, some previous results showed that an increase in 
agent’s wealth may be beneficial to the principal. Jung (2017), based on 
the principal–agent model of Baker and Hall (2004), showed that, as the 
agent is wealthier, given that the degree of risk aversion decreases, the 
principal’s compensation cost also falls. Thus, the principal prefers rich 
agents over poor ones. Moreover, he unveiled that, as the agent becomes 
wealthier, he is provided with low-powered incentives.
Meanwhile, studies on the principal–agent problem considering 
adverse selection and moral hazard are found in various fields. In 
competitive insurance markets, Stewart (1994) considered the agents 
who can exert efforts in reducing the probability of the loss but its cost 
is private information. He showed that high-risk agents purchase the 
same coverage with the one which is offered in the absence of adverse 
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selection, but that low-risk agents purchase the lower coverage than the 
one which is offered when adverse selection is absent. 
In competitive labor markets, Moen and Rosen (2005) considered the 
model in which the agents’ effort and its cost are private information. 
They showed that, in a separating equilibrium, the power of incentives 
for agents with lower cost (or higher productivity) exceeds the efficient 
level, and that the welfare loss can be eliminated by a tax on high 
income. Recently, Bénabou and Tirole (2016) considered the labor 
markets with adverse selection about workers’ talents. They showed 
that, as the competition of the labor market becomes fiercer, the 
power of incentives for all agents escalates, and that when the market 
competition exceeds a certain level, high types are over-incentivized 
relative to social efficiency.
As explained earlier, almost all literature about asymmetric 
information focused on adverse selection about agents’ effort cost or 
their productivity. However, this paper considers adverse selection 
about agents’ wealth (and risk preference). More concretely, we analyze 
the principal–agent problem in which the agents’ actions and wealth 
are hidden from the principal. For this, we borrow the settings used in 
Jung (2017), but consider the case that agents’ wealth is two type. We 
first derive the characteristics of the optimal contracts for agents when 
the agents’ wealth is known to the principal, and then investigate how 
the optimal contracts change when it becomes hidden.
As shown in Jung (2017), in the case that the principal has 
information on agents’ wealth, the power of incentives for rich agents 
is greater than the one for poor agents. However, when agents’ wealth 
is hidden, the optimal contracts designed for all agents under moral 
hazard are no longer valid. The reason is that rich agents can have 
higher utility by selecting the incentive contract aimed at poor agents. 
This means that rich agents will act like poor agents when their wealth 
is hidden. Thus, the principal must design a new menu of contracts 
targeting rich and poor agents.
Compared with the optimal contracts derived in the case that 
the agents’ wealth is known, the optimal menu of contracts has the 
following two characteristics: First, for the optimal contract aimed at 
rich agents, the power of incentives is same with the one under moral 
hazard, but the fixed wage level is high enough for them to enjoy 
rent over the reservation utility level. Second, for the optimal contract 
targeting poor agents, the power of incentives is lower than the one 
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under moral hazard, and the fixed wage level is determined as much 
as their reservation utility level is satisfied at a minimum. Resultantly, 
hidden wealth problem harms poor agents, but profits rich agents.
Our result implies that the difference of incentive powers among 
agents becomes worse by screening when agents’ risk preference is 
private information. This helps us understand the difference of incentive 
powers for workers within firms. According to some empirical studies, 
the introduction of performance pay may cause wage inequality from 
the difference of workers’ productivities, as seen in Lemieux, MacLeod, 
and Parent (2009). The literature has actually concentrated on income 
inequality because of the gap of productivities among workers. However, 
our result shows that such a difference can be partially explained by 
the difference of the risk preferences among risk-averse agents and it 
will be worse when their risk preference is hidden from firms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II suggests our basic 
model. Section III provides our results in the cases that agents’ wealth 
is known and when it is hidden and discusses the loss of the social 
welfare from hidden wealth problem. Section IV presents the conclusion.
II. Basic Model
We consider one-period principal–agent model in which a risk-neutral 
principal hires risk-averse agents with different levels of initial wealth. 
After each agent exerts his/her effort a ∈ [0,∞), output x is realized. 
Output x is normally distributed with mean a and variance σ2. That is, 
x ~ N(a,σ2). Moral hazard problem will be resolved by providing wage 
scheme s(x) depending on his outcome x.
Each agent has the negatively exponential utility: U(s,a;ρ) = −(1/ρ)
e-ρ(s-c(a)), where s is income and c(a) is his/her cost from exerting effort a. 
We assume that, for all a > 0, c'(a) > 0 and c''(a) > 0 with c(0) = c'(0) = 0 
and c''(0) ≥ 0, and that c'''(a) ≥ 0 for all a ≥ 0. These assumptions mean 
that cost of effort c(a) and marginal cost c'(a) are strictly increasing 
and convex in a. Moreover, ρ > 0 is the agent’s degree of absolute risk 
aversion and it has different values according to his/her initial wealth.
When the agent is provided with linear contract, such as s(x) = α + 
βx,1 his/her expected utility is calculated as follows:
1 Based on Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1987) result, the optimal contract is a 
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 ρρ ρ α β β σ
ρ
= − − + − −E U s x a a c a 2 21[ ( ( ), ; )] exp{ [ ( ) ]}.
2
Here, we define CE = α + βa − c(a) − (ρ/2)β2σ2, which means the certainty 
equivalent. Given that function −(1/ρ)e-ρ(s-c(a)) is strictly increasing in 
y, we use the CE as the agent’s expected utility. When the agent is 
compensated with linear contract, he/she will choose an effort level 
that maximizes his/her expected utility (i.e., certainty equivalent). Given 
that his/her CE is concave in a, his/her effort choice should satisfy the 
following condition:
 β = c'(a).
Let a = a(β) solve the above equation. This function indicates that 
agent’s effort choice is a(β) when the slope of linear contract is equal to 
β. Given that c'(a(0)) = 0 = c'(0), a(0) = 0. Given that differentiating β ≡ 
c'(a(β)) regarding β gives 1 = c''(a(β))a'(β), we have 
 
β β
β
′ = > ∀ >
′′
a
c a
1( ) 0, 0,
( ( ))  (1)
where the strict inequality holds given c”(a) > 0 for all a > 0 by 
assumption. At this time, agent’s (expected) utility is represented as
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ≡ + − −u a c a 2 2( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) .
2
The principal should respect the agent’s reservation utility level ū. Thus, 
his/her participation constraint is written as u(α,β;ρ) ≥ ū. Furthermore, 
when the linear contract s(x) = α + βx is provided, the principal’s 
(expected) profit is 
 π α β α β β α β β≡ − = − + = − +E x s x E x E x a a( , ) [ ( )] [ ] { [ ]} ( ) [ ( )],
where the second equality holds because E[x] = a(β). 
linear contract in the principal-agent model in which the agent has a negatively 
exponential utility and the outcome is normally distributed.
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Each agent has initial wealth w that affects his/her degree of risk 
aversion, i.e., ρ = ρ(w). In this paper, we consider the two-type case that 
w = wH with probability pH, and w = wL with probability pL = 1 − pH. It 
is assumed that wL < wH and that ρ(w) is a decreasing function. Thus, 
we have ρL ≡ ρ(wL) > ρ(wH) ≡ ρH, indicating that the richer agent is less 
risk averse.
III. Results
In this section, we address the situation wherein agents’ wealth is 
common information, and then the situation wherein it is hidden from 
the principal.
A. When agents’ wealth is known
In this subsection, we begin with the case that the wealth levels of 
the agents are known to the principal. Thus, we consider the principal–
agent relationship only with the moral hazard problem. In this situation, 
the principal can design a linear contract si(x) = αi + βix for each agent 
by selecting (αi, βi), i = L,H. Therefore, he/she must determine (αL, 
βL) and (αH, βH) for agents with low wealth wL and high wealth wH, 
respectively.
The principal’s profit maximization problem is 
 s.t. i)
      ii) 
α β α β
π α β π α β
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
+
= + − − ≥
= + − − ≥
L L H H
L L L H H H
L
L L L L L L L L
H
H H H H H H H H
p p
u a c a u
u a c a u
, , ,
2 2
2 2
max ( , ) ( , ),
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ,
2
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) .
2
In the above problem, the first and second constraints indicate the 
participation constraints for the agents with wealth wi and so ρi, i = L,H, 
respectively. As seen in the principal’s problem, the objective function is 
decreasing in αL and αH. Hence, the principal’s profit can be maximized 
by determining αL and αH to satisfy agents’ participation constraints at 
a minimum:
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 (2)
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρα β β β β σ
= + − − =
⇒ = − + +
L
L L L L L L L L
L
L L L L L
u a c a u
u a c a
2 2
2 2
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ,
2
( ) ( ( )) ,
2
and
 (3)
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρα β β β β σ
= + − − =
⇒ = − + +
H
H H H H H H H H
H
H H H H H
u a c a u
u a c a
2 2
2 2
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ,
2
( ) ( ( )) .
2
By substituting Equations (2) and (3) for αL and αH in the objective 
function, the principal’s problem is rewritten as 
 β β φ β ρ φ β ρ+ −L H L L L H H H
p p u
,
max ( ; ) ( , ) ,  [MP]
where
 
ρφ β ρ β β β σ= − −a c a 2 2( ; ) ( ) ( ( )) .
2
ϕ(0; ρ) = a(0) − c (a(0)) = 0 because a(0) = 0 given that c '(a(0)) = 0 = c '(0).
The following lemma verifies the existence and uniqueness of a 
solution to the maximization problem [MP] under our assumptions 
regarding cost function c (a).
Lemma 1. For any given ρ > 0, ϕ(β; ρ) is strictly concave on interval (0,1), 
and is decreasing on interval (1,∞). Thus, for any ρ > 0, a solution to 
maximize ϕ(β; ρ) uniquely exists on interval (0,1).
Proof. Differentiating ϕ(β; ρ) with respect to β gives
 
β
βφ β ρ β β β ρσ β ρσ β
β
−′ ′ ′= − − = −
′′
a c a a
c a
2 21( ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ,
( ( ))
where the second equality holds because c '(a(β)) ≡ β by the definition
of a(β) and a'(β) = 1/c'' by Equation (1). For all β > 1, because (1 − β) 
/ c''(a(β)) ≤ 0 and ρσ2β > 0, we have ϕβ(β; ρ) < 0, implying that ϕ(β; ρ) is 
decreasing in  β ∈ (1,∞) for any given ρ > 0. Differentiating ϕβ(β; ρ) one 
more regarding β yields
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ββ
βφ β ρ β ρσ
β ρσ
′′′ ′
= − − − −
′′ ′′
′′′ 
= − + − × − ′′ ′′ 
c a
c c
c
c c
2
2
2
2
1 ( )( ; ) (1 )
[ ]
11 (1 ) .
[ ]
where the second equality holds by Equation (1). Because c''(a(β)) > 0 
and c'''(a(β)) ≥ 0 for any a(β) > 0 by assumption, we have ϕββ(β; ρ) < 0 for 
all β ∈ (0,1), indicating that ϕ(β; ρ) is strictly concave on interval (0,1).
Given that a(0) = 0, and because c''(a(0)) = c''(0) ≥ 0, we have ϕβ(0; ρ) = 
1/c''(0) > 0 and ϕβ(1; ρ) = −ρσ2 < 0. Resultantly, given that ϕ(β; ρ) is strictly 
concave on interval (0,1) with ϕβ(0; ρ) > 0 and ϕβ(1; ρ) < 0 and because 
ϕ(β; ρ) is strictly decreasing on interval (1,∞), a solution to satisfy ϕβ(β; ρ) 
= 0 uniquely exists on interval (0,1). Q.E.D.
Let the solution to the principal’s problem in [MP] be (βL
*, βH
*). Then, βi*, 
i = L, H, must satisfy the first-order condition:
 (4)
 
βφ β ρ β β β ρ σ β
β ρ σ β
β
′ ′ ′= − − =
−
⇔ = ∀ =
′′
i i i i i i i
i
i i
i
a c a a
i L H
c a
2
2
( ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0
1 , , ,
( ( ))
where the equivalence is satisfied because c'(a(βi)) = βi and given that 
a'(βi) = 1/c''(a(βi)). Equation (4) shows that βi* depends on ρi, for i = L, H. 
Moreover, define
 π φ β ρ φ β ρ= − + −m H L H H L L H H Hp w w p w p w u
* *( , , ) (1 ) ( ; ( )) ( ; ( )) ,
which indicates the principal’s maximized profit under moral hazard.
Proposition 1. βL* < βH* and πm(pH, wL, wH) is increasing in pH, wL and 
wH.
2
Proof. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, solution βi* satisfying 
Condition (4) is less than one, i.e., βi* < 1. In addition, for all βi ∈ (0,1), 
the LHS of Condition (4) is decreasing, but the RHS is increasing. Thus, 
an increase in the slope of the RHS of Condition (4) by an increase in ρi 
2 This proposition is derived in the two-type case. For generalized results, see 
Proposition 3 in Jung (2017).
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reduces the value of βi*, implying βL
* < βH
* given that ρL > ρH.
Given that βH
* is a maximizer of function ϕ(β; ρH), we have ϕ(βH
*; ρH) > 
ϕ(βL
*; ρH). Moreover, because ϕρ(β; ρ) = − βσ
2/2 < 0 for all β > 0, ϕ(βL
*; ρ) is 
decreasing in ρ, implying ϕ(βL
*; ρH) > ϕ(βL
*; ρL). Thus, we have ϕ(βH
*; ρH) > 
ϕ(βL
*; ρL). Given this, differentiating π
m(pH, wL, wH) regarding pH gives
 
π φ β ρ φ β ρ∗ ∗∂ = − >
∂
m
H L H H H L L
H
p w w
p
( , , ) ( ; ) ( ; ) 0.
Differentiating πm(pH, wL, wH) with respect to wi, i = L, H, makes
 
β ρ
ρ
βπ φ β ρ φ β ρ ρ
ρ
φ β ρ ρ
β σ ρ
∗
∗ ∗
∗
∗
∂ ∂ ′= × +
∂ ∂
′=
′= − >
m i
H L H i i i i i i i
i i
i i i i
i i i
p w w p w p w w
w
p w
p w2 2
( , , ) ( ; ( )) ( ) ( ; ( )) ( )
( ; ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) 0,
2
where the second equality is satisfied given that ϕβ(βi*; ρi) = 0 by the first-
order condition.   Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 contains three results. The first is that the power 
of incentives for the rich agent is greater than the one for the poor 
agent (see Figure 1). This is mainly because the rich agent has a lower 
Figure 1
Comparison of the inCentive powers under moral hazard
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degree of absolute risk aversion than the poor agent, i.e., ρL = ρ(wL) 
> ρ(wH) = ρH. Thus, the poor agent will demand more risk premium 
against accepting a risky incentive wage contract, which increases the 
principal’s cost. Thus, providing low-powered incentives for the poor 
agent rather than for the rich agent is beneficial to the principal. The 
second is that the net benefit from the rich agent, ϕ(βH
*; ρH), is greater 
than the one from the poor, ϕ(βL
*; ρL), implying that an increase in the 
proportion of rich agents is beneficial to the principal (see Figure 2). 
Finally, the third is that a decrease in the degree of risk aversion raises 
principal’s profit. Thus, given that an increase in the wealth level of 
every agent makes him/her become less risk averse, the principal’s 
profit increases with agents’ wealth.
B. When agents’ wealth is hidden
In this subsection, we consider the case that agents’ wealth is hidden 
from the principal. In this case, each agent can independently choose 
any contract that is offered by the principal. However, if the principal 
offers every agent the set of two contracts, such as (αL
*, βL
*) and (αH*, βH*), 
what happens then? The following proposition explains it.
Proposition 2. Consider the situation under which, although agents’ 
wealth is hidden, (αL
*, βL
*) and (αH*, βH*) are still offered to agents. Then, all 
agents select (αL
*, βL
*), but nobody does (αH*, βH*).
Figure 2
Graphs for ϕ(β; ρL) and ϕ(β; ρH)
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Proof. Given (αi*, β i*), because the participation constraint for the 
agent with wealth wi must be binding at the optimum, we have
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= + − − = ∀ =ii I i i i i i iu a c a u i L H
2 2( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) , , .
2  (5)
The above equation shows that when the agent with wealth wi selects (αi
*, 
β i
*), his/her expected utility level is equal to u−. 
Now, if the agent with low wealth wL selects (αH
*, βH*), his/her utility 
level is
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρ ρ β σ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗
= + − −
= − − <
L
H H L H H H H H
L H H
u a c a
u u
2 2
2 2
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
2
1 ( )( ) ,
2
where the second equality holds because αH* + βHa(βH
*) − c(a(βH*)) = u− + ρ β σ∗H H 2 2( )2  from Equation (5), and where the last strict inequality holds 
given ρL > ρH. Thus, we have u(αH
*, βH* ; ρL) < u(αL
*, βL
* ; ρL), indicating the 
poor agent still prefers (αL
*, βL
*) to (αH*, βH*).
Meanwhile, if the agent with high wealth wH selects (αL
*, βL
*), his/her 
utility level is
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρ ρ β σ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗
= + − −
= + − >
H
L L H L L L L L
L H L
u a c a
u u
2 2
2 2
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
2
1 ( )( ) ,
2
where the second equality holds because α β β β∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+ − =L L L La c a( ) ( ( ))ρ β σ∗+ L Lu 2 2( )2  from Equation (5). Thus, we have u(αL
*, βL
*; ρH) > u(αH
*, βH*; 
ρH), indicating that the rich agent prefers (αL
*, βL
*) to (αH*, βH*).  Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 shows that, when agents’ wealth is hidden from the 
principal, rich agents, unlike the poor, have an incentive to select the 
contract (αL
*, βL
*). The reason is simple: The less risk-averse agent with 
high wealth can extract rent by taking more risk premium. This is the 
reason why the rich agents mimic the poor. Thus, in this case, the 
menu of two contracts (αL
*, βL
*) and (αH*, βH*) can no longer be optimal.
Now, by the Revelation Principle, the principal must design a new 
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menu of contracts under which all agents are transparent. For this, the 
principal’s problem is
 [AMP]
α β α β
π α β π α β
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρ ρα β β β β σ α β β β β σ
α β
+
= + − − ≥
= + − − ≥
+ − − ≥ + − −
+
L L H H
L L L H H H
L
L L L L L L L L
H
H H H H H H H H
L L
L L L L L H H H H H
H H
p p
s.t u a c a u
u a c a u
a c a a c a
, , ,
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
max ( , ) ( , )
. i) ( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ,
2
ii) ( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ,
2
iii) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ,
2 2
iv) ρ ρβ β β σ α β β β β σ− − ≥ + − −H HH H H L L L L La c a a c a
2 2 2 2( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) .
2 2
The above problem still contains the participation constraints for the 
poor and the rich agents, but the last two constraints are newly added. 
The two constraints indicate that all agents should prefer the contract 
which is prepared for themselves by the principal to the one for others. 
More precisely, they mean that the principal should design the menu 
of contracts under which the rich agent prefers (αH, βH) to (αL, βL), and 
simultaneously, the poor agent prefers (αL, βL) to (αH, βH).
Let (αL
0, βL
0) and (αH
0, βH
0) be a solution to [AMP]. The following 
proposition reveals their characteristics.
Proposition 3. βH0 = βH* but βL0 < βL*, resulting in βH0 > βL0. βL0 is decreasing 
in ρL, but increasing in ρH. Moreover, βL
0 is decreasing in pH with 
 β β ∗
→
=
H
L Lp
0
0
lim  and β
→
=
H
Lp
0
1
lim 0.
Under the menu of optimal contracts, the expected utility of poor and 
rich agents is
 
α β ρ α β ρ ρ ρ β σ= = + −L L L H H H L H Lu u u u
0 0 0 0 0 2 21( , ; ) , and ( , ; ) ( )( ) ,
2
respectively.
The formal proof of the above proposition is presented in the 
Appendix. As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the two constraints 
i) and iv) must be binding, but the two constraints ii) and iii) must 
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be non-binding at the optimum. The reason that the participation 
constraint for the poor agent should be binding but the one for the 
rich agent should be non-binding at the optimum, is because the poor 
agent tells the truth, but the rich agent has an incentive to lie. Thus, 
the principal compensates the poor agent at a minimum, but inevitably 
permits the rich agent to enjoy rent over u−. Moreover, constraint iv) 
should be binding, because the principal should provide an incentive 
to tell the truth for the bad guy (i.e., rich agent), while constraint iii) 
should be non-binding because the good guy (i.e., poor agent) has no 
incentive to lie. These results enable us to deal with the problem [AMP] 
subject to only the two binding constraints i) and iv). Thus, the problem 
[AMP] is rewritten by
β β
φ β ρ ρ ρ β σ φ β ρ− − +
L H
H
L L L L H L H H H
L
pp p
p
2 2
,
max [ ( ; ) ( ) ] ( ; ).
2  
[RP]
The solution βH
0 to [RP] should satisfy the first-order condition regarding 
βH, that is,
 
βφ β ρ β β β ρ σ β
β ρ σ β
β
′ ′ ′= − − =
−
⇔ =
′′
H H H H H H H
H
H H
H
a c a a
c a
2
2
( ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0
1 ,
( ( ))
which is equivalent to Condition (4) for i = H. Thus, we have βH
0 = βH
*. 
Meanwhile, the solution βL0 to [RP] should satisfy
 
(6)
 
βφ β ρ ρ ρ β σ
β β β ρ β σ ρ ρ β σ
β ρ ρ ρ σ β
β
− −
′ ′ ′= − − − − =
 −
⇔ = + − ′′  
H
L L L H L
L
H
L L L L L L H L
L
L H
L L H L
L L
p
p
pa c a a
p
p
c a p
2
2 2
2
( ; ) ( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) 0
1 ( ) ,
( ( ))
which has the same form with Condition (4) for i = L, except that ρL in 
the RHS of Condition (4) is replaced with term ρL + (pH / pL)(ρL − ρH) in 
Condition (6). Given that (pH / pL)(ρL − ρH)σ
2 > 0, we have βL
0 < βL
* (see 
Figure 3). Furthermore, an increase in the slope of βL in the RHS of 
condition (6), [ρL + (pH / pL)(ρL − ρH)]σ
2, decreases the value of βL
0. Thus, 
an increase in ρL, a decrease in ρH, or an increase in pH lowers the value 
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of βL
0 by increasing the value of ρL + (pH / pL)(ρL − ρH). In particular, ρH 
positively affects βL
0 by shortening the gap between the degrees of risk 
aversion of rich and poor agents (i.e., ρL − ρH).
3 
As shown in Proposition 3, when the agents’ wealth is hidden, the 
incentive power for agents being richer and less risk averse remains 
unchanged, but poorer agents’ incentive power becomes lower. This 
is because the rich agents watch thirstily for a chance to profit 
additionally by picking up the incentive contract prepared for poor 
agents. Hence, for the principal to prevent the less risk-averse agents 
from mimicking the more risk-averse agents, the poor agents’ incentive 
power is getting lower.
The results in the Proposition 3 imply that the difference of the 
incentive powers between rich and poor agents widens further when 
agents’ wealth becomes hidden. The reason is that Δβ* ≡ βH
* − βL
* < βH
0 
− βL
0 ≡ Δβ0, where the strict inequality is satisfied given βH
0  = βH
* and βL
0 
< βL
*. More importantly, Proposition 3 reveals that the difference Δβ0 
decreases with (ρL, pH) but increases with ρH. This means that, given 
that the degree of risk aversion ρ(w) is a decreasing function of wealth 
3 An increase in (ρL − ρH) expands the difference βH
0 − βL
0, which worsen the 
social welfare. This issue will be discussed in the next subsection.
Figure 3
Comparison between the inCentive powers under adverse seleCtion problem 
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w, the gap of incentive powers is expanded by a decrease in the poor 
agent’s wealth wL, by an increase in the rich agent’s wealth wH, and/or 
by an increase in the proportion of rich agents, pH. Because a change in 
the distribution of wealth in the sense of mean-preserving spread can 
be made by a decrease in wL, an increase in wH, and/or an increase 
in pH, our results in the Proposition 3 imply that the gap of incentive 
powers among heterogenous agents is escalated when wealth inequality 
increases.
The principal’s maximized profit is represented by
 
π φ β ρ ρ ρ β σ
φ β ρ
≡ − − −
+
a H
H L H H L L L H L
H H H
pp w w p w w w
p w
0 0 2 2
0
( , , ) (1 ) ( ; ( )) [ ( ) ( )]( )
2
( ; ( )).
The following proposition uncovers the characteristics of profit function 
πa(pH, wL, wH).
Proposition 4. The profit function πa(pH, wL, wH) is increasing in wL 
and wH. Moreover, π
a(pH, wL, wH) is strictly convex in pH, implying that 
πa(pH, wL, wH) is increasing in pH.
Proof. ρφ β ρ β σ= −i i i0 0 2 2
1( ; ) ( )
2
 for all i = L,H. Although, as seen in 
Condition (6), βL0 is a function of (ρL, pH), the use of the Envelope 
Theorem makes
 
ρπ φ β ρ ρ β σ ρ
β σ ρ
′ ′= − −
′= − >
L
a H
w H L H H L L L L L
L L
pp w w p w w
w
0 0 2 2
,
0 2 2
( , ) (1 ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 ( ) ( ) 0,
2
where strict inequality holds given ρ'(wL) < 0, and 
 
ρπ β σ ρ φ β ρ ρ
β β σ ρ
′ ′= +
′= − − >
H
a H
w H L H L H H H H H
H
H L H
pp w w w p w w
p w
0 2 2 0
,
0 2 0 2 2
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ; ( )) ( )
2
[( ) ( ) ] ( ) 0,
2
where the strictly inequality holds because βH
0 > βL
0 by Proposition 3. 
Thus, πa(pH, wL, wH) is increasing in wL and wH.
Similarly, even if βL
0 is a function of pH, the Envelope Theorem yields
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 πap(pH, wL, wH) = ϕ(βH
0 ; ρH) − ϕ(βL
0 ; ρL) − ρ ρ β σ−L H L
0 2 21 ( )( ) ,
2
  
which differentiating one more with respect to pH gives
 πapp(pH, wL, wH) = −[ϕβ(βL
0 ; ρL) +(ρL − ρH)βL
0σ2] β∂×
∂
L
Hp
0
.
For any given ρL > 0, because ϕ(β; ρL) is strictly concave on interval (0,1), 
because βL
* is the unique maximizer of function ϕ(β; ρL) (i.e., ϕβ(βL
* ; ρL) = 
0), and because βL
0 < βL
* < 1, we have ϕβ(βL
0 ; ρL) > 0. Thus, given that βL
0 is 
decreasing in pH by Proposition 3, the sign of π
a
pp(pH, wL, wH) is positive, 
meaning that πa(pH, wL, wH) is strictly convex in pH, or equivalently 
πap(pH, wL, wH), is increasing in pH. If π
a
p(pH = 0, wL, wH) > 0 is satisfied, it 
implies πap(pH, wL, wH) > 0 for all pH ∈ [0,1]. By Proposition 3, βH
0 = βH
* and 
when pH = 0, βL
0 = βL
*. Thus, because ϕ(βH
* ; ρH) > ϕ(βL
* ; ρH) as shown in the 
proof of Proposition 1, we have
 πap(pH = 0, wL, wH) = ϕ(βH
* ; ρH) − ϕ(βL
* ; ρL) − ρ ρ β σ∗−L H L
2 21 ( )( )
2
> ϕ(βL
* ; ρH) − ϕ(βL
* ; ρL) − ρ ρ β σ∗− =L H L
2 21 ( )( ) 0.
2
Therefore, because πap(pH = 0, wL, wH) > 0, π
a(pH, wL, wH) is increasing in 
pH.  Q.E.D.
The above Proposition shows that the principal’s profit πa(pH, wL, wH) 
is increasing in wealth of all agents. For the poor agent, an increase in 
wL lowers his degree of risk aversion ρ(wL). This results in two effects: 
It decreases his/her risk premium, which increases the profit. Also, it 
lessens the gap between the degrees of risk aversion of poor and rich 
agents (i.e., ρL − ρH), which makes rent over −u for rich agents drop, so 
that the profit increases. Hence, the principal’s profit always increases 
with wL. Similarly, for the rich agent, an increase in wH decreases his/
her degree of risk aversion ρ(wH). This first widens the gap (ρL − ρH), 
which increases the rent for rich agents, which reduces the profit. 
However, a decrease in ρ(wH) simultaneously reduces risk premium 
of rich agents, which increases the profit. Given that the latter effect 
dominates the former by βH
0 > βL
0, an increase in wH positively impacts 
the principal’s profit. 
Furthermore, the Proposition 4 shows that the principal’s profit 
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function πa(pH, wL, wH) is strictly convex in pH. This means that the 
first derivative of πa(pH, wL, wH) with respect to pH, π
a
p(pH, wL, wH), is 
an increasing function of pH. Thus, because π
a
p(pH = 0, wL, wH) > 0 as 
shown in the proof of the Proposition 4, it implies that πap(pH, wL, wH) > 0 
for all pH ∈ [0,1]. From this, we conclude that π
a(pH, wL, wH) is also an 
increasing function of pH.
Proposition 4 indicates that the principal prefers an increase in 
wealth level of any agent and an increase in the proportion of rich 
agents. The increases in the levels of agents’ wealth and/or in the 
proportion of high wealth mean that a distribution of agents’ wealth is 
changed in the sense of the first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). 
Consequently, what Proposition 4 really says is that the principal 
prefers an improvement of the wealth distribution in the FOSD sense.
C. Welfare Loss
In this subsection, we address changes in social welfare. We assume 
that social welfare is the sum of the principal’s profit and agent’s 
expected utility. So, define
 
π α β α β ρ φ β ρ
= =
= + =∑ ∑i i i i i i i i i
i L H i L H
SW p u p
, ,
[ ( , ) ( , ; )] ( ; ),
where the second equality holds because
 
ρπ α β α β ρ β β β σ φ β ρ+ = − − ≡ii i i i i i i i i iu a c a
2 2( , ) ( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ; ).
2
When the agents’ wealth is known, the social welfare is
 φ β ρ φ β ρ∗ ∗= − +m H L H H L L H H HSW p w w p w p w( , , ) (1 ) ( ; ( )) ( ; ( )),
and when it is hidden, the welfare is
 φ β ρ φ β ρ= − +a H L H H L L H H HSW p w w p w p w
0 0( , , ) (1 ) ( ; ( )) ( ; ( )).
Then, because βH
0 = βH
*, the welfare loss is written by
 φ β ρ φ β ρ
≡ −
= − −
m a
H L H H L H H L H
H L L L L
L p w w SW p w w SW p w w
p w w* 0
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
(1 )[ ( ; ( )) ( ; ( ))].
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This equation indicates that the loss is determined by the powers of 
incentives for the agent with low wealth wL, (i.e., βL
* and βL
0) and his/
her degree of risk aversion ρ(wL). βL
* depends on ρL which is a decreasing 
function of wL as shown in Condition (4), whereas βL
0 depends on wi 
through ρ(wi), i = L, H, and on pH as shown in the Proposition 3. Thus, 
the loss is affected by (pH, wL, wH).
Let us analyze the effects of (pH, wL, wH) on the welfare loss. First, 
differentiating L(pH, wL, wH) with respect to wH gives
 
β
βφ β ρ ρ
ρ
∂ ∂ ′= − − × >
∂ ∂
L
H L L H
H H
L p w w
w
0
0(1 ) ( ; ( )) ( ) 0,
where the strict inequality holds because βφ β ρ β ρ> ∂ ∂ >L L L Hw
0 0( ; ( )) 0, / 0
 
and ρ'(wH) < 0. This means that an increase in the wealth level of 
rich agent raises the welfare loss. The reason is as follows: when wH 
increases, the difference (ρL − ρH) widens by lowering ρH, which reduces 
βL
0. Given βL
* and ρL, it always raises the welfare loss.
However, the effects of wL and pH on the loss are ambiguous. To see 
the reason, let us differentiate the loss function with respect to wL. The 
envelope theorem gives
 
(6)
ρ ρ β
β
βφ β ρ φ β ρ ρ φ β ρ ρ
ρ
σ ββ β ρ φ β ρ ρ
ρ
∗
∗
= =
 ∂ ∂  ′ ′= − − − × ×  ∂ ∂ 

∂    ′ ′= − − − × + − × ×     ∂ 
 


L
H L L L L L L L L
L L
L
H L L L L L L
L
C D
L p w w w w w
w
p w w w
0
0 0
2 0
2 0 2 0
(1 ) ( ; ( )) ( ; ( )) ( ) ( ; ( )) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ; ( )) ( ) .
2
Given that βL
* > βL
0, term C in Equation (6) is positive. However, because 
ϕβ(βL
0 ; ρL) > 0 and because ∂βL
0 / ∂ρL < 0 by Proposition 3, term D is 
negative. Hence, the sign of Equation (6) is positive if C + D ≥ 0, but is 
negative otherwise.
An increase in wL lowers the degree of risk aversion ρ(wL) by 
assumption. The two terms C and D capture direct and indirect effects 
of wL on the welfare loss by lowering the degree of risk aversion, 
respectively. First, a decrease in ρL by an increase in wL directly 
expands the difference ϕ(βL
* ; ρL) − ϕ(βL
0 ; ρL) β ββ φ β ρ β
∗
= ∫ L
L
L d0 ( ; )  because ϕβ = (1 
− β) / c''(a(β)) −ρβσ2 is a decreasing function of ρ. Thus, an increase in wL 
raises the welfare loss directly. Meanwhile, as shown in the Proposition 
3, a decrease in ρL increases βL
0, which reduces the difference ϕ(βL
* ; ρL) 
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− ϕ(βL
0 ; ρL). Thus, an increase in wL reduces the welfare loss indirectly. 
Consequently, if the direct effect dominates the indirect one, an increase 
in wL positively affects the welfare loss, but otherwise it has a negative 
effect.
Next, differentiating the loss function with respect to pH gives
 (7)β
βφ β ρ φ β ρ φ β ρ∗
=
=
 ∂ ∂ = − − + − − ×  ∂ ∂ 

L
L L L L H L L
H H
F
G
L w w p w
p p
0
0 0( ; ( )) ( ; ( )) (1 ) ( ; ( )) .
Term F in Equation (7) is negative because βL
* > βL
0, but term G is positive 
because ϕβ(βL
0 ; ρL) > 0 and ∂βL
0 / ∂pH < 0
.
 Similarly, terms F and G 
indicate 
direct and indirect effects of pH, respectively. Directly, an increase in 
pH lowers the loss by decreasing pL. However, it also drops βL
0, which 
increases the welfare loss by widening the difference ϕ(βL
* ; ρL) − ϕ(βL
0 ; ρL). 
Consequently, if the former effect dominates the latter, an increase in 
pH reduces the welfare loss, but otherwise it expands the loss.
The following proposition analyzes the behaviors of the loss function 
when effort cost is quadratic.
Proposition 5. The loss function L(pH, wL, wH) is increasing in wH. 
However, the effects of pH and wL are ambiguous. Nevertheless, when
=
kc a a 2( ) ,
2
 the loss function L(pH, wL, wH) is increasing in pH and wL 
under the following conditions, respectively:
 
ρ ρ ρ
σ
− −  − ≤ + 
 
H H
L H L
H
p p
p k2 2
(2 )(1 ) 1 ,
and 
 
ρ ρ ρ
σ
 − ≤ + 
 
L H LK k 2
1 ,
where 
 
( )
( )
− + − − −
≡
− + − −
H H H H
H H H H
p p p p
K
p p p p
(1 ) 3 (1 )(9 )
.
1 (1 )(9 )
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Proof. When = kc a a 2( ) ,
2
 because c'(a) = ka, we have a(β) = β/k. Hence, 
solving Equations (4) and (6) separately makes
β
ρ σ
∗ = ≡
+L Lk A
2
1 1 ,
1  and 
β
ρ ρ ρ σ
= ≡
 
+ + − 
 
L
H
L L H
L
Bpk
p
0
2
1 1 .
1 ( )
Fundamentally, B > A for all pH ∈ (0,1), and as pH → 0, B → A. Then, we 
have
 ρ ρ
σ σφ β ρ φ β ρ β β∗ ∗    − = − − = + −   
   
L L L L L L
A A
A B B
2 2
0 2 0 2
2( ; ) ( ; ) [( ) ( ) ] 1 1 ,2 2
and 
 
β
β σφ β ρ
ρ
∂  × = − − ∂ −  
L
L L
L H
A
p B B
0 2
0
2( ; ) 1 .(1 )
Thus, Equation (6) becomes
 
σ σ ρ
σ ρ
 ∂       ′= − + − + −      ∂ −      
    ′= − ×   
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H L
L H
L
L A A Ap w
w A B B p B B
A Af w
A B B
2 2
2 2
2
2
(1 ) 1 1 1 ( )
2 (1 )
1 ( ),
2
where f(t) = 2t2 − (1 − pH)t − (1 − pH). For t1 < 1 satisfying f(t1) = 0, 
if A / B ≤ t1, we have ∂L / ∂wL ≥ 0. Solving f(t1) = 0 yields t1 = (1 − pH 
+ − −H Hp p(1 )(9 ) )/ 4 and then solving inequality A / B ≤ t1 makes
 
ρ ρ ρ
σ
− −  − ≥ + 
 
H
L H L
H
t p
t p k
1
2
1
(1 )(1 ) 1 .
Similarly, we have
φ β ρ φ β ρ∗
    − = − − = − +    
     
L L L L
A AB A
kA kB kA B B
2
0
2
1 1 1( ; ) ( ; ) (2 ) 1 2 ,
2 2 2
and 
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β
βφ β ρ ∂  = − − ∂  
L
L L L
H H
Ap
p kp B B
20
0 1( ; ) 1 .
Thus, Equation (7) becomes 
 ∂        = − − + + − = ×        ∂          H H H
L A A A Ah
p kA B B kp B B kp A B
2 21 1 11 2 1 ,
2 2
where h(t) = (t − 1)2(2t − pH). For t2 = pH / 2 < 1 satisfying h(t2) = 0, if A 
/ B ≥ t2 = pH / 2, because h (A / B) ≥ 0, we have ∂L / ∂pH ≥ 0. Solving 
inequality A / B ≥ pH / 2 makes
 
ρ ρ ρ− −  − ≤ + 
 
H H
L H L
p p
p k2 2
(2 )(1 ) 1
It completes the proof.  Q.E.D.
IV. Conclusion
We examined how the incentive contracts for agents with low and 
high wealth are changed from when their wealth is known to the 
principal to when it is hidden. For it, we first considered the case that 
the wealth levels which all agents have are known to the principal. In 
this case, the power of incentives for rich agents is greater than the 
one for poor agents, because the rich agents’ degree of risk aversion 
is less than the poor agents. This means that, for a given agent, an 
increase in his wealth increases the principal’s profit by lowering his/
her risk premium. Thus, the increases in wealth of any agent and in the 
proportion of rich agents raises the principal’s profit.
However, when agents’ wealth is hidden from the principal, if the 
menu of the optimal contracts designed for rich and poor agents when 
it is known is still offered, rich agents have an incentive to select the 
contract targeting poor agents. Fundamentally, rich agents want to 
mimic poor agents. Therefore, the principal must design a new menu of 
contracts under which rich agents are transparent.
Compared with the case wherein agents’ wealth is known, the power 
of incentives for rich agents remains unchanged, but the one for poor 
agents declines. It means that rich agents should be prevented from 
mimicking poor agents by lowering the power of incentive for the poor 
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and then reducing the risk premium which rich agents may enjoy. 
Resultantly, the power of incentives for poor agents decreases when the 
principal concerns adverse selection problem.
We have shown that the power of incentives for poor agents is 
decreased by the increases in the degree of risk aversion of poor agents 
and in the proportion of rich agents, but increased by an increase in 
the degree of risk aversion of rich agents. However, even under these 
properties, we have shown that the principal’s profit is increasing in 
wealth of any agent and in the proportion of rich agents. This means 
that the principal prefers an improvement of wealth distribution in 
the sense of the first-order stochastic dominance. Furthermore, we 
have shown that the welfare loss from hidden wealth increases with 
the wealth level of rich agents. The reason is that an increase in their 
wealth expands the gap of the degrees of risk aversion between rich 
agent and poor agents, so that the power of incentives aimed at poor 
agents further declines. Ultimately, it aggravates the welfare loss. 
However, the effects of poor agents’ wealth and the proportion of rich 
agents on the welfare loss is unclear. 
In reality, the wealth levels of agents are rarely open to the principal. 
Our study is meaningful in that we suggest theoretical results 
considering such situation seriously. However, our results have a 
limitation in the sense that we assume the wealth level of agents is two 
type. Thus, the studies in the case that agents’ wealth is multi-type will 
be needed in the future.
(Received 31 August 2020; Revised 9 October 2020; Accepted 13 October 
2020)
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Appendix
The proof of Proposition 3. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma A. Constraint ii) should be non-binding at the optimum.
By constraint iv), we have
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρα β β β β σ
ρα β β β β σ
= + − −
≥ + − −
> + − − ≥
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H H H H H H H H
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L L l L L
L
L L l L L
u a c a
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a c a u
2 2
2 2
2 2
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( ))
2
( ) ( ( ))
2
( ) ( ( )) .
2
where the strict inequality holds because ρL > ρH and the last inequality 
holds by constraint i). Thus, because constraints iv) and i) imply that 
u(αH, βH; ρH) > −u. , constraints ii) should be non-binding at the optimum. 
Q.E.D.
The above Lemma A allows us to solve [AMP] without constraint ii). 
Thus, the Lagrange function is
β β α β β α
ρλ α β β β β σ
ρ ρµ α β β β β σ α β β β β σ
ρ ρµ α β β β β σ α β β β β σ
= − − + − −
+ + − − −
+ + − − − − + +
+ + − − − − + +
L L L L H H H H
L
L L L L L L
L L
L L L L L L H H H H H
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a c a u
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2
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2 2
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2 2
where λL, μL and μH are Lagrange multipliers for constraints i), iii) and 
iv), respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the followings:
 α λ µ µ= − + + − =L L L L HL p 0,  (A.1)
 α µ µ= − − + =H H L HL p 0,  (A.2)
 
β β β β λ µ β ρ σ β
µ β ρ σ β
′= − + − + + −
− − =
L L L L L L L L L L
H L H L
L p a a a
a
2
2
[ ( ) (1 ) ( )] ( )[ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ] 0,  
(A.3)
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 β β β β µ β ρ σ β
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(A.4)
 λ α β ρ λ α β ρ− = ≥ − ≥L L L L L L L Lu u u u[ ( , ; ) ] 0, 0, ( , ; ) 0,  (A.5)
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α β ρ α β ρ
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− ≥
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u u
u u
[ ( , ; ) ( , ; )] 0, 0,
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µ α β ρ α β ρ µ
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− = ≥
− ≥
H H H H L L H H
H H H L L H
u u
u u
[ ( , ; ) ( , ; )] 0, 0,
( , ; ) ( , ; ) 0.  
(A.7)
The combination of Conditions (A.1) and (A.2) gives
 − (pL + pH) + λL = 0  ⇔  λL = 1,
where the above equivalence is satisfied because pL + pH = 1. Thus, 
because λL > 0, we have u(αL, βL; ρL) = −u by Condition (A.5). Moreover, by 
Condition (A.2), we have 
 μH = pH + μL ≥ pH > 0,
where the first inequality is satisfied by μL ≥ 0, implying u(αH, βH; ρH) = 
u(αL, βL; ρH) by Condition (A.7). Rearranging Equations (A.2) and (A.3) 
yields
 λL + μL = pL + μH   and   − μL = pH − μH .  
By using these conditions, Conditions (A.3) and (A.4) become 
respectively
β β β β µ β ρ σ β µ β ρ σ β
β β ρ σ β µ ρ ρ σ β
′= − + − + + − − −
′= − − − − =
L L L L L L H L L L H L H L
L L L L L H L H L
L p a a p a a
p a
2 2
2 2
[ ( ) (1 ) ( )] ( )[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]
[(1 ) ( ) ] ( ) 0,  
(A.8)
and
 
β β β β µ β ρ σ β
µ β ρ σ β
β β ρ σ β µ ρ ρ σ β
′= − + − + + −
+ −
′= − − + − =
H H H H H H H H L H
H H H H
H H H L H H L H H
L p a a p a
a
p a
2
2
2 2
[ ( ) (1 ) ( )] ( )[ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ]
[(1 ) ( ) ] ( ) 0.  
(A.9)
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Lemma B. Constraint iii) should be non-binding at the optimum.
Suppose that constraint iii) is binding at the optimum, that is, 
 u(αL, βL; ρL) = u(αH, βH; ρL). (A.10)
As shown earlier, because μH > 0, constraint iv) must be binding, that 
is, 
 u(αH, βH; ρH) = u(αL, βL; ρH). (A.11)
Combining Equations (A.10) and (A.11) gives
 
α β ρ α β ρ α β ρ α β ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρσ β σ β σ β σ β
σ ρ ρ β β
+ = +
⇔ − − = − −
⇔ − − =
L L L H H H H H L L L H
L H L H
L H H L
L H H L
u u u u
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2
( , ; ) ( , ; ) ( , ; ) ( , ; )
2 2 2 2
( )( ) 0,
2
from which we have βH = βL because ρL > ρH. Hence, rearranging 
Equations (A.8) and (A.9) gives
 
µβ β ρ σ β ρ ρ σ β′− − = −HL L L L L H L
L
a
p
2 2(1 ) ( ) ( ) ,
 
(A.12)
and
 
µβ β ρ σ β ρ ρ σ β′− − = − −HL L L L L H L
H
a
p
2 2(1 ) ( ) ( ) ,
 
(A.13)
respectively. Thus, combining Equations (A.12) and (A.13) makes 
µ µρ ρ σ β ρ ρ σ β µ ρ ρ σ β
 
− = − − ⇔ + − = 
 
H H
L H L L H L H L H L
L H L Hp p p p
2 2 21 1( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
which implies βL = 0 because μH > 0 and ρL > ρH. Thus, because  a'(0) 
= 1 / c''(a(0)) = 1 / c''(0) > 0 by c''(0) ≥ 0, when βL = 0, we have from 
Equation (A.8)
 LβL = pLa' (0) > 0,  
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which is a contradiction to LβL = 0. Therefore, constraint iii) must 
be non-binding at the optimum, implying μL = 0 by Condition (A.6). 
Q.E.D.
Given that μL = 0 by the Lemma B, from (A.2), we have μL = pH, Thus, 
from Condition (A.9), we have
 
(A.14)
 
β β ρ σ β ρ ρ σ β
β β ρ σ β
β ρ σ β
β
′− − + −
′= − − =
−
⇔ =
′′
H H H L H H L H H
H H H H H
H
H H
H
p a p
p a
c a
2 2
2
2
[(1 ) ( ) ] ( )
[(1 ) ( ) ] 0
1 ,
( ( ))
where the equivalence holds because β
β
′ =
′′H H
a
c a
1( ) .
( ( ))
 Moreover, from 
Condition (A.8), we have
 
(A.15)
 
β β ρ σ β ρ ρ σ β
β β ρ ρ ρ σ β
β ρ ρ ρ σ β
β
′− − + − =
 
′⇔ − = + − 
 
 −
⇔ = + − ′′  
L L L L L H L H L
H
L L L L H L
L
L H
L L H L
L L
p a p
pa
p
p
c a p
2 2
2
2
[(1 ) ( ) ] ( ) 0
(1 ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ,
( ( ))
where the last equivalence holds because β
β
′ =
′′L L
a
c a
1( ) .
( ( ))
Condition (A.14) is identical to Condition (4) when i = H, indicating βH
0  
= βH
* . And, because term ρL + pH(ρL − ρH) / pL in the RHS of Condition 
(A.15) is greater than ρL in the RHS of Condition (4) when i = L, we 
have βL
0 < βL
* . Thus, because βH
0  = βH
* > βL
* > βL
0, we have βH
0 > βL
*.
Furthermore, βL
0  is a decreasing function of g(pH, ρL, ρH) ≡ ρL + pH(ρL 
− ρH) / (1 − pH) in the bracketed term in the RHS of (A.15). Given that 
g(pH, ρL, ρH) increases with pH and ρL but decreases with ρH, βL
0 
is decreasing in pH and ρL and increasing in ρH. Especially, as 
pH → 0, g(pH, ρL, ρH) → ρL. This makes Condition (A.15) for βL
0 be 
identical with Condition (4) for βL
* , resulting in βL
0 = βL
*. Meanwhile, 
as pH → 1, because pH / pL = pH / (1 − pH) goes to ∞, the slope 
of the right hand side of (A.15) goes to ∞, implying βL
0  = 0. 
Given that constraint i) must be binding at the optimum, the expected 
utility of agents with wealth wL is
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ρα β ρ α β β β β σ= + − − =LL L L L L L L Lu a c a u
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) .
2  
(A.16)
Meanwhile, because constraint iv) must be binding at the optimum, the 
expected utility of agents with wealth wH is
 
ρα β ρ α β β β β σ
ρ ρ β σ
= + − −
= + −
H
H H H L L L L L
L H L
u a c a
u
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0 2 2
( , ; ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
2
1 ( )( ) ,
2
where the second equality holds because α β β β+ − =L L L La c a
0 0 0 0( ) ( ( ))
ρ β σ+ L Lu
0 2 2( )
2
 from Equation (A.16).   Q.E.D.
